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LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL:
DRAWING A LINE IN THE SAND
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the fed-
eral and state governments' from taking private property "for public use
without just compensation."' The United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted this proscription to encompass not only physical appropriations of
property,3 but also land use regulations that cause diminution in property
value.4 Fifth Amendment scrutiny of land use regulations has evolved dra-
matically and controversially5 since Justice Holmes's landmark declaration
that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking."6
Formulating a systematic and uniform method for determining whether
and when a land use regulation goes "too far" has proven a difficult, if not
impossible,7 task for the Supreme Court.8 The Court's approach to regula-
i. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239
(1897).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." See generally Wil-
liam M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985) (discussing the historical development of the
Just Compensation Clause).
3. See discussion infra part I.D.2.
4. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
5. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 562 (1984) (suggesting that Pennsylvania Coal "seems to have gener-
ated most of the current confusion about takings").
6. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. When a landowner believes a regulation affecting
his property has gone "too far," he may sue the government through inverse condemnation,
challenging the regulation as a Fifth Amendment violation, and demand just compensation.
Id. See generally 7A PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.03 (3d ed. 1992).
7. The search for a clear understanding of the distinction between "regulation" and
"taking," remarks one commentator, is "the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field
of contemporary land-use law ... one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's
hunt for the quark." CHARLES M. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976), quoted in
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 649 n.15 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978). For
an excellent overview of the various approaches employed by the Supreme Court and the
"chaos" it has created in current takings law, see Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In
Search of Underlying Principles, Part IV-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77
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tory takings challenges is best described as an ad hoc balancing of private
and public interests, focusing on the factual circumstances of each case.'
Nonetheless, from the Court's takings decisions an identifiable tendency has
emerged toward attaching greater weight to a regulation's negative impact
on the affected property's value.'°
Predating this trend, however, exists a conflicting doctrine known as the
nuisance exception, which holds economic impact irrelevant, no matter how
severe, where the government purpose behind the use restriction is suffi-
ciently important. 1 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 12 drastically
reconstructed the role of nuisance principles in regulatory takings analysis,
severely diminished its vitality as an exception to the compensation require-
ment, and realized the tendency toward treating economic impact as a cru-
cial factor in the Court's takings decisions." a
The Supreme Court has held that a taking occurs if a regulation is irra-
tional or if it denies a landowner all economically viable use of his prop-
erty.14 Before Lucas, however, the Court had never had an opportunity to
review a regulatory takings claim that involved total destruction of economi-
cally beneficial use; prior cases involved only partial destruction.' 5 There-
fore, there existed little guidance on how the Court would analyze such a
situation. In Lucas, the Court had the opportunity to squarely face this
issue. 16
CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1989); see also Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J.
36, 37 (1964) (finding the Court's approaches "incompatible" and "confusing").
9. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Among the factors considered are the regula-
tion's economic impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, the importance of
the government interest, and the character of the government action. Id.; see also Penn-
sylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415-16 (emphasizing that takings decisions do not lend themselves
to "general propositions").
10. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980).
11. See discussion infra part I.A.
12. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
13. See discussion infra parts II.A.1, II.B.2.
14. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; see discussion infra part I.D.1.
15. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296-
97 (1981); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 120-21 (1978).
16. In Lucas, the Court presumed that the South Carolina regulation at issue denied Lu-
cas all economically beneficial use of his property. 112 S. Ct. at 2896 n.9. However, Justice
Souter found this factual premise upon which the case rests sufficiently questionable to have
warranted dismissal of the writ of certiorari. Id. at 2925 (statement of Souter, J.). The pre-
sumption troubled three other Justices as well. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2919, n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In 1986, David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots for $975,000 on a
barrier island off the South Carolina coast. 7 Lucas intended to erect single
family homes on his lots, as the owners of adjacent lots had already done.' 8
In 1977, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act,' 9 which requires owners of designated "critical area"2° to obtain a
permit from the South Carolina Coastal Council (the Council) before begin-
ning development. 2' Lucas's lots were not considered "critical area" under
the legislation when he acquired them in 1986.22
In an effort to preserve the beach/dune system along its coast,23 in 1988
South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management Act (the Act).24 The
Act prohibited, without exception, the construction of any permanent, habit-
able structures on any beach area that the Council designated as critically
eroding.25 Lucas's lots were so designated.26
Lucas then filed suit in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas,
claiming that the Act effected a taking of his property without just compen-
sation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.27 That court agreed, finding that the Act rendered the lots valueless,
and ordered the Council to compensate Lucas.2" The South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed. 29 Drawing from the 1887 United States Supreme
Court decision in Mugler v. Kansas, °3 the court reasoned that the Act pre-
vented a serious public harm (erosion of barrier coastline) and as such did
not trigger the compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment's Tak-
ings Clause, regardless of its effect on the property's value, because the State
17. 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
18. Id.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 to -220 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
20. "Critical area[s]" are those deemed highly vulnerable to erosion and as such are de-
fined as any coastal waters, tidelands, beaches, and certain beach/dune systems. Id. § 48-39-
10(J).
21. Id. § 48-39-130(A); see Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
22. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
23. Specifically, the legislature found it necessary to protect the beach/dune system be-
cause it serves as a storm barrier, a basis for the tourism industry, a habitat for numerous
species, and an environment for leisure time. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1992).
24. Id. § 48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
25. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(2).
26. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992).
30. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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has the authority to prohibit noxious uses of property. 3' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.32
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first dismissed the Council's asser-
tion that Lucas's claim was unripe for review.33 The Court then stated the
supposedly preexisting categorical rule that a regulation effects a taking
when it denies a landowner all economically beneficial use of his prop-
erty34 -a questionable assertion in light of prior cases. 35 Operating under
the presumption that the Act in question rendered Lucas's property value-
less, 36 the Court held that compensation was owing unless the Council could
prove on remand that background principles of South Carolina's property
and nuisance law address the use Lucas intends.3 7 In so holding, the Lucas
Court made huge strides toward safeguarding the rights of property owners
and placed formidable hurdles before government entities aiming to restrict
land uses without triggering the Fifth Amendment's compensation
requirement.
This Note begins with a survey of the Supreme Court's treatment of tak-
ings claims prior to Lucas. The survey includes a discussion of the early
development of the nuisance exception, the subsequent introduction of eco-
nomic impact as an important consideration in takings inquiries, the pro-
gression of takings jurisprudence into formal rules and balancing tests, and
an assessment of the state of regulatory takings law just prior to Lucas.
Next, this Note summarizes the Court's rationale underlying its new cate-
31. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2905.
32. 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
33. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890-92. The Court's treatment of the ripeness issue is not the
subject of this Note, but is worthy of comment, and perhaps criticism. See id. at 2906-08
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2917-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Prior to the issuance of the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion, the legislature
amended the Act to authorize the Council to issue "special permits" providing exceptions to
the construction prohibitions. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991). Lucas
had not attempted to obtain a permit prior to the Supreme Court's decision. Lucas, 112 S. Ct.
at 2890. Therefore, since Lucas had not obtained a final decision regarding the disposition of
his property, the Council argued that definitive adjudication of his takings claim would be
inappropriate. Id. The Court rejected this argument because the South Carolina Supreme
Court had disposed of Lucas's takings claim on the merits and Lucas had properly alleged
injury-in-fact with respect to the period before the 1990 amendment. Id. at 2891. But see
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986) (requiring exhaus-
tion of right to apply for a special permit before proper adjudication of takings claim); Wil-
liamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172,
190-91 (1985) (holding that an agency must arrive at final definitive position regarding land in
question before a court can evaluate factors in takings claim); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981).
34. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
35. See infra part III.A.l.
36, Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896 n.9.
37. Id. at 2901.
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gorical economically beneficial use rule and then outlines Lucas's drastic re-
construction of the nuisance exception. The analysis examines Justice
Scalia's method in arriving at the categorical rule and creating a new role for
the nuisance exception. This Note then evaluates the dissenting Justices'
complaints, explaining why most of their concerns are misplaced, and con-
cludes that the end result of Lucas is consistent with the Fifth Amendment.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S MANY APPROACHES TO TAKINGS CASES
A. The Nuisance Exception
Rooted in Supreme Court precedent dating back to the turn of the century
is a takings analysis doctrine known as the nuisance exception. 8 During
this time, the Court grappled with the issue of how broadly to interpret the
states' "police power"-the power to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of its citizens. 9 Cases that brought this issue before the Court often in-
volved a private property owner's assertion that a government restriction on
the use of his property severely damaged its value, and thus violated the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause or constituted deprivation of property
without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.' The series of
cases that addressed this apparent conflict between the states' police power
and the constitutional safeguards for private property gave rise to the nui-
sance exception to the compensation requirement.41
38. See generally Sax, supra note 8, at 48-50 (providing summary and critique of noxious
use theory); Thomas A. Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regula-
tory Taking Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use," "Average Reciprocity of Advantage,"
and "Bundle of Rights" From Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 653, 658-93 (1987) (discussing the noxious use theory and its relationship to police
power). The nuisance exception doctrine is sometimes referred to as "noxious use" doctrine,
the latter simply referring to the label attached to the proscribed activity.
39. While without any precise definition, courts use the term "police power" to refer to
those valid state restrictions that aim to promote the health, safety and welfare of its citizens
and do not necessitate compensation or violate due process. See generally Sax, supra note 8, at
36 n.6; see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 373 (1926).
40. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (addressing a law that effec-
tively shut down operation of a quarry in a residential area); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928) (requiring the destruction of cedar trees to prevent infection of nearby apple trees);
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365 (dealing with a zoning ordinance that placed housing density restric-
tions on private property); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (addressing a law that
prohibited operation of a brick mill in a residential area); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S.
171 (1915) (addressing an ordinance that prohibited operation of a livery stable in a densely
populated city); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (dealing with a law that prohibited the
manufacture of alcoholic beverages).
41. For an excellent discussion of the cases giving rise to the nuisance exception, see Hip-
pier, supra note 38, at 658-93.
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The nuisance exception doctrine originated in the 1887 Mugler cases.4 2
The appellants in these cases were engaged in the manufacture of beer prior
to the enactment of a Kansas statute prohibiting such manufacture.4 3 Be-
cause the prohibition severely reduced the value of their property," which
was specifically designed for the manufacture of beer, the appellants claimed
the law deprived them of their property without due process, in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 5 The Supreme Court upheld the
statute and denied compensation, finding the law a valid exercise of the
state's police power.46
After deferring to the legislature's finding that the manufacture of intoxi-
cating liquors is harmful to the general welfare," and as such constituted a
public nuisance, the Court affirmed that the state's police power is unre-
strained in its authority to abate a nuisance, even to the extent that it may
consequently destroy the value of private property.4 8 It would be improper,
the Court argued, to burden the police power by requiring compensation for
every resulting pecuniary loss. 49 The Court reasoned further that no one has
the right in the first instance to do that which the government finds injurious
to the public.5" In effect, all property is held under an "implied obligation"
to restrain from such uses.5 '
In cases following Mugler the Supreme Court applied this logic to uphold
state use restrictions against challenges that they severely diminished prop-
erty values. As such, these cases formed a substantial exception to the Fifth
Amendment's compensation requirement in cases where it might otherwise
be due.52 Under this "nuisance exception," the prohibited use need not be
42. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 623. The Mugler cases addressed the claims of three people-
Mugler, Ziebold, and Hagelin-who were each separately engaged in the beer manufacturing
business before the enactment of the Kansas statute prohibiting it. Id.
43. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5, 8, ch. 128 (1881) (repealed).
44. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 675.
47. Specifically, the Court accepted the legislature's finding that "idleness, disorder, pau-
perism, and crime" are related to the manufacture of alcohol. Id. at 662.
48. Id. at 658. The Mugler Court was very unwilling to burden the state with the possi-
bility of a compensation requirement because the Court regarded the state's police power as an
important aspect of the sovereignty of the states and in preserving federalism. Id.
49. Id. at 669.
50. Id. at 663.
51. Id. at 665. This "implied obligation"-that an owner may not use his property in a
way that is detrimental to the public-was, to the Court, "essential to the peace and safety of
society." Id. Moreover, the court found the "implied obligation" to be consistent with, and as
fundamental as, the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate that no person shall be deprived "of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665 (citing U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
52. See Craig A. Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme
Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 345 (1988) (commenting that "[i]t appears settled
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inherently harmful regardless of surroundings-a "nuisance per se "-nor an
activity constituting a nuisance under the state's common law;5 3 any activity
that a legislature finds detrimental to the public welfare, even if innocent in
itself, triggers the nuisance exception.54 Destruction of long-established
businesses sometimes went uncompensated for the sake of preventing rather
vague harms, such as "the evils of over-crowding." 55 The only limitation on
regulatory power contained in the nuisance exception doctrine, oft-repeated
but rarely fatal, was that exercise of the police power must not be arbitrary
or unreasonable. 56
In sum, the Court's standard for analyzing regulatory takings during this
time was largely based on the amorphous common law maxim that one
should use his property in such a manner as not to injure that of another,57
with minimal scrutiny of legislative findings and acceptance of significant
consequential private losses suffered.5" Beginning in 1922, however, the
that a government may destroy all economic use of property if necessary to avoid a public
nuisance and promote public safety").
53. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962) (holding that a prohibited
use need not be a common-law nuisance in order to fall within the noxious use doctrine);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (stating that "[a] nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place"); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410
(1915) (rejecting the argument that a use that is not a nuisance per se cannot legislatively be
declared a nuisance in fact); see also Sax, supra note 8, at 49 (commenting on the innocence of
prohibited uses in noxious use cases).
54. Cases considering legislative determinations that an activity innocent by itself none-
theless constituted a nuisance include: Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, (1928) (growing red
cedar trees was declared a nuisance when the trees were a source of a disease that infected
nearby apple orchards); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388 (developing land for residential use considered
a nuisance because it would cause an undesired increase in traffic, noise, and other "evils of
over-crowding"); and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (operating a brick mill
deemed a nuisance where the smoke and soot it spewed caused discomfort to residents nearby).
55. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388; see also Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 174
(law prohibiting operation of livery stable prevented "offensive odor").
56. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (applying arbitrary or unreasonable test); Reinman,
237 U.S. at 171 (affirming a state's power to declare an activity a nuisance in fact if not done
arbitrarily).
For a sound assessment of this aspect of the nuisance exception doctrine, see William B.
Stoebuck, Police Power Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1062, 1070
(1980) (concluding that the noxious-use test is a "tautologous restatement of the rule that no
valid exercise of the police power is a taking.... [It] is simply ... the test for substantive due
process and is not a test for taking at all.").
57. The Court has referred to this maxim, often in the Latin sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, for determining when an activity is a nuisance and whether a state has appropriately
used its police power to abate the activity. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
58. See, e.g., id. at 384 (75% loss); Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405 (87 1/2% loss). But see
Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911) (invalidating prohibition on cattle-grazing on claim-
ant's land, stating that the police power cannot "be exercised to destroy essential uses of pri-
vate property").
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Court began to accept that otherwise valid exercises of the police power
could trigger the Fifth Amendment's compensation requirement.
B. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: Recognition of a "Regulatory
Taking" and Introduction of the Diminution in Value Theory
Early Supreme Court analysis of regulatory takings claims precluded bal-
ancing public benefit with private losses suffered when the Court adhered to
the nuisance exception; once the Court found the requisite harm and deter-
mined that the challenged regulation was rationally based, private loss was
of no consequence.59 In time, however, the Court recognized that unlimited
deference to the police power would make the Fifth Amendment's prohibi-
tion meaningless. 6° Accordingly, the Court began to include diminution in
property value as a factor in determining whether particular regulations con-
stituted a taking.6' This qualified the police power with a more rigorous test
than the mere "unreasonable and arbitrary" test previously employed.62
Justice Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon ,63 that a regula-
tion can go "too far,"' is best known for initiating this approach.65
In Pennsylvania Coal, the plaintiffs sued to enjoin the Pennsylvania Coal
Company from mining underneath their property, which was causing subsi-
dence of the surface and their home.66 Though the deed conveying this land
had expressly reserved the coal company's mining rights below the surface, 67
the plaintiffs pointed to a Pennsylvania statute68 that prohibited the mining
of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause subsidence of a surface dwell-
59. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658 (1887) (stating that police power to
stop a nuisance can extend to the destruction of property).
60. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
61. Regulatory takings cases in which the Court has considered economic impact include:
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
62. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365, 387 (upholding a zoning ordinance as within the
police power, and hence not a taking, because it was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable). The
Pennsylvania Coal Court seemed to apply a less deferential standard of review. See Seth E.
Zuckerman, Note, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States." The Claims Court Takes a Wrong
Turn-Toward a Higher Standard of Review, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 753, 764-65 (1991).
63. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
64. Id. at 415.
65. For an in-depth discussion of Pennsylvania Coal, see Rose, supra note 5, at 566-69.
The author criticizes Pennsylvania Coal for the ambiguity inherent in its "too far" doctrine,
pondering, for example, "how much diminution in value is too much" and "How much of
what?" Id. at 566.
66. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
67. Id.
68. The Kohler Act, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198.
1070 [Vol. 42:1063
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ing.69 The statute concededly destroyed previously existing property
rights.7" The Court needed to decide whether the statute was a valid exer-
cise of the police power or a taking of property requiring compensation
under the Fifth Amendment. 71
Justice Holmes began his opinion by reciting an understanding previously
recognized by the Court: that private property rights have an implied obliga-
tion to yield to the police power of the state.72 He then, however, decided
whether the law was a valid exercise of the police power by balancing the
public benefit and private losses the Act entailed, resting on the premise that
reduction in value of property is a relevant factor in determining whether a
regulation effects a taking.73 The Court found that the public benefit fell
short of justifying the private lOSS 74 and, therefore, the state had exceeded its
police powers.75
Over a vigorous dissent, 76 the Supreme Court thus modified the nuisance
exception doctrine in a substantial respect: the issue became a question of
degree rather than a bright-line, deferential test of validity hinging merely on
a legislature's decree that a use is detrimental to the public. 77 After Penn-
sylvania Coal the Supreme Court, with increasing frequency, 78 began to fac-
tor diminution in value into its takings analysis, 79 attaching to it varying
69. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
70. Id. at 413.
71. In the words of Justice Holmes: "The question is whether the police power can be
stretched so far." Id.
72. Id. at 413; see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).
73. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
74. Justice Holmes reasoned that the private loss outweighed the public benefit in this
case because the latter only consisted of preventing subsidence of a single home and could not
justify the destruction of Pennsylvania Coal's support estate nor causing its business to become
commercially impracticable. Id. at 413-14.
75. Id. at 414.
76. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (insisting on adherence to rigid nuisance exception
rule, stating that a regulation "imposed to protect the public ... is not a taking").
77. Id. at 416. Note that Justice Holmes actually advanced this idea nearly 15 years
before Pennsylvania Coal in dictum that suggested the boundary between the police power and
private property interests is not a bright line, but a question of degree. Hudson County Water
Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (upholding a law prohibiting the transport of state
water into other states is not a taking despite a claim that the law took riparian rights of
property). Justice Holmes analogized using the example of a government restriction on the
height of a building: when the limit approaches a height that makes a building lot entirely
useless there would be a taking. Id.
78. The Court did not immediately adopt Pennsylvania Coal's emphasis on considering
economic impact and instead continued to embrace the nuisance exception doctrine for some
time. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
79. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1190-93 (1967)
(discussing and criticizing the diminution in value theory as employed by the Supreme Court);
Sax, supra note 8, at 50-60 (same).
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degrees of importance depending upon the particular test formulated or fol-
lowed," o but always considering it nonetheless.
C. A Balancing Test
After the Supreme Court recognized diminution in value as relevant to its
regulatory takings analysis, this factor remained merely that, a factor, for a
long time. While acknowledging the impact a regulation worked on the
value of private property, the Court often stated that diminution in value
was not determinative of the takings issue, even where the use restriction
denied the most profitable use of the property." In fact, the Court shrank
from making any single factor dispositive of the takings question or propos-
ing any general formulae, preferring instead to employ ad hoc, factual in-
quiries in each case.82 General and elusive principles of justice and fairness,
tempered by the underlying intent of the Fifth Amendment, guided the
83Court in its decisions. Hence, a multifactor balancing approach was
thought most appropriate for takings analysis.8 4
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co. 5 exemplifies the Court's bal-
ancing approach to solving takings questions after the recognition in Penn-
sylvania Coal that diminution of value is relevant.8 6 Central Eureka
involved a wartime order issued for purposes of conserving labor and equip-
ment 87 that required Central Eureka Mining Co. to close its gold mines tem-
porarily. 8 Central Eureka alleged that the order effected a Fifth
80. See, e.g., infra notes 96-128 and accompanying text (discussing the Penn Central bal-
ancing test); infra part I.D. 1. (discussing the Agins two-pronged test).
81. See United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (stating
that a denial of the most profitable use of land is insufficient to establish a taking); see also
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (applying the same rule in cases of personal
property).
82. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
83. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's
guarantee ... was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."); Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (observing that "the question at bottom
is upon whom the loss of the changes desired should fall").
84. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 451 (1982) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (observing "history teaches that takings claims are properly evaluated
under a multifactor balancing test").
85. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
86. See supra part I.B. (discussing diminution in value theory).
87. War Production Board Limitation Order L-208, 7 Fed. Reg. 7992-93 (October 8,
1942).
88. Central Eureka, 357 U.S. at 156-58.
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Amendment taking of its right to mine gold during the life of the order and,
hence, required compensation."9
The Supreme Court took several factors into account before concluding
that the order did not work a taking. First, the Court considered the fact
that the order damaged the mine owners in depriving them of the most prof-
itable use of their property. Without explanation, however, the Court dis-
missed this factor as insufficient by itself to establish a taking." The absence
of government occupation or possession of the gold mines was also a rele-
vant factor.9" A third observation in the Court's analysis was that the order
was issued in the context of war.92 This outweighed the former two factors
because the mine owners' economic losses were trifling when compared to
the demands of war.93
Despite a dissent that found deprivation of economically beneficial use
controlling,9 4 the Court held that that factor was not dispositive in the in-
stant case, largely because wartime demands outweighed it.95 By implica-
tion, a situation could arise where the diminution in economic value might
outweigh the government purpose underlying it, leading the Court to find a
taking.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City9 6 is renowned for for-
mulating a three-prong test for the Supreme Court's balancing approach to
takings analyses.97 While Penn Central made clear that consideration of
economic impact is indeed important in takings inquiries, 8 as Pennsylvania
Coal first advanced,99 the Court refrained from elevating this factor beyond
89. Id. at 161.
90. Id. at 168.
91. Id. at 165-66.
92. That the order was issued in the context of war made the government interest ex-
tremely important. Id. at 168-69. Additionally, the Court felt that the economic impact of
wartime restrictions was minuscule in comparison to other impacts of the war that are also
uncompensated, such as the loss of life and freedom. Id.
93. Id. at 168.
94. Id. at 184 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government's requiring an indus-
try to close at severe economic cost is the "equivalent of outright physical seizure" and there-
fore a taking).
95. Id. at 169.
96. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
97. Penn Central has been criticized for further confusing the Court's already complicated
approach to takings cases. The three factors introduced by the case-the character of the
government action, the economic impact, and interference with investment-backed expecta-
tions-may each be defined differently and afforded varying degrees of importance. For an
insightful discussion and comment, see Peterson, supra note 8, at 1317-27.
98. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
99. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
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the status of a "relevant consideration ''  and identified two other factors
that the Court must consider.' 0 '
Penn Central involved New York City's Landmark Preservation Law, 
10 2
administered by the Landmarks Preservation Commission and designed to
preserve the historical and aesthetic integrity of certain buildings that the
Commission designated as landmarks.' °3 Grand Central Terminal was so
designated."0 The owner of the terminal, Penn Central Transportation Co.,
planned to construct a multi-story office building above the terminal and
applied for the necessary permit from the Commission.l10 The Commission
denied the application. 10 6 Stripped of its right to pursue the most profitable
use of its property, ' 07 Penn Central challenged the application of the law as
violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 108
The Court began by stating that it eschews any fixed rules for takings
decisions and instead engages in ad hoc, factual inquiries." Then the Court
identified three factors of "particular significance"" 0 to the takings issue:
economic impact, interference with distinct investment-backed expectations,
and lastly, the character of the government action," 1 such as requiring phys-
ical invasion"2 or exploiting private property for government purposes."'
Balancing these factors, the Court concluded that the Landmarks Law did
not effect a compensable taking.' 14 Specifically, the Court found that the
100. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
101. The Court found that considering economic impact a determinative factor was inap-
propriate in a takings inquiry in light of prior case law that took into account other factors of
particular significance as well, thus necessitating the need to "balance" all of these factors
together. Id.; see infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
102. The law imposed certain restrictions and duties on owners of landmark properties in
order to preserve their historic integrity, such as keeping the building in good repair and ob-
taining permission prior to altering or improving the building. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 111-
12.
103. Id. at 110.
104. Id. at 115-16.
105. Id. at 116.
106. Id. at 117. The Commission concluded that the proposed construction-a 55-story
office tower balanced atop a "flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade"-would be "an aesthetic joke."
Id. at 117-18.
107. Id. at 120.
108. Id. at 119.
109. Id. at 124; accord Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986)
(observing that the Court has failed to announce a clear test for determining regulatory takings
cases); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979) (noting the absence of a
more precise test).
110. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
111. Id.
112. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (creating
a per se physical invasion test for determining when a taking occurs).
113. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262-63 n.7 (1946).
114. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
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interference with the property's economic value"' was of insufficient magni-
tude to require compensation, reasoning that the law neither interrupted
present uses nor prevented a reasonable return on investment, and noting
that Penn Central had transferable rights allowing development else-
where.16 These factors mitigated any losses the Landmarks Law caused. 117
The Court also believed the action was reasonably related to promoting the
general welfare of the city,118 did not exploit the property for city pur-
poses,119 and involved no physical invasion or occupation. 12 Accordingly,
the Court held that the character of the action lacked indicia of a taking. 2'
Penn Central reinforced the approach of including economic impact as
one consideration in the Court's regulatory takings analyses. Nonetheless,
the Court refused to regard it as determinative of the takings issue and in-
stead balanced it against other factors. 122 Denial of the most beneficial use
or full exploitation of a property interest was clearly not dispositive in Penn
Central,12 3 nor was it in takings cases that followed. 124 Yet neither of the
other two factors which Penn Central proffered were dispositive either. 125
The Court offered little guidance on the weight that a court should attach to
each of the three prongs in the Penn Central test, and thus, the case is sub-
115. The Court defined the relevant unit of property as the city tax block designated as a
landmark ("the parcel as a whole"), refusing to examine the economic impact with respect to a
discrete segment of the property, i.e., the air rights above the terminal. Id. at 130-31. The
proposed office building had a guaranteed yearly rental value of $3 million. Id. at 141 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 137.
117. Id. at 136-37.
118. Id. at 134.
119. For further discussion of this consideration in takings decisions-whether a govern-
ment action involves appropriation of the benefits of private property to benefit the govern-
ment in its operations as opposed to balancing, as arbiter, the competing interests in uses of
private property among individuals-see Sax, supra note 8, at 62-67 (advancing a
"[g]overnment-as-enterpriser" versus "government-as-mediator" distinction as the most sensi-
ble and comprehensive test for regulatory takings decisions); see also United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 262-63 n.7 (1946) (holding that frequent government flights over the claimant's
property that caused a disturbance on the surface was a taking because, inter alia, government
was "using a part of it for the flight of its planes").
120. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 131.
123. Id. at 130.
124. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (finding no taking where law
required disclosure of health and safety data and thereby admittedly completely deprived
claimant of his property-trade secrets in the data); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)
(upholding an act prohibiting the sale of protected bird parts despite a claim that it denied the
most profitable use).
125. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
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ject to much judicial discretion and manipulation. 2 6 The case in effect
makes available a "grab bag" of sorts from which a judge can choose any
factor upon which to expound in his takings analysis, achieving a result tai-
lored to his own preferences. 127
However, the Court in Penn Central did discuss economic impact at
length in an effort to show that economic viability remained, presumably
underscoring its importance. This approach is markedly different from that
of earlier cases that employed the nuisance exception, which held severity of
economic impact irrelevant.' 2 '
D. Formalization of Takings Law and the Increasing Importance of
Economic Impact
1. A Two-Pronged Test
Agins v. City of Tiburon 129 represents an example of the Supreme Court's
shift away from multi-factor balancing and toward more definite principles
of what constitutes a taking. 3" After Agins had acquired a five-acre tract of
unimproved land, the City rezoned the property with a density restriction
under which Agins could build no more than five single-family homes on the
entire tract. '' Agins challenged the law as facially invalid 132 and effecting a
taking, claiming that the rezoning prevented their plans to develop the prop-
erty for residential use and thereby completely destroyed its value.' 133
The Court resolved the takings issue by applying a two-pronged test, sum-
marily announced" 4 as follows: A law effects a taking if it "does not sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner
126. See, e.g., Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Regulatory Takings. Beyond the Balancing Test, 20
URB. LAW. 389, 391 (1988) (remarking that the aftermath of Penn Central "has been a shape-
less body of law"); Stoebuck, supra note 56, at 1069 (concluding that the alternative theories
embodied in the case "create a situation of near anarchy").
127. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 1317. The author argues that "[Penn Central's] three
factors have provided little structure to the Court's takings analysis. First, the Court has
defined each factor in a variety of ways, without acknowledging the shifts in definition. Sec-
ond, it is difficult to predict what weight the Court will give to each factor." Id.
128. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
129. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
130. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1621-22 (1988)
(describing the Supreme Court's increasing tendency to adopt more formal, categorical rules of
decision).
131. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
132. The Court did not decide the issue of whether application of the law constituted a
taking, finding no concrete controversy for that issue. Id. at 260-61.
133. Id. at 258.
134. Notably, after the Court announced this rule it then recited that there are no precise
rules in takings cases and that there should be a weighing of public and private interests. Id. at
260-61.
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economically viable use of his land."' 135 Using this test, the Court held that
the law did not constitute a taking.1 36
The zoning ordinance passed the first prong of the test because its purpose
was "to protect the residents ... from the ill effects of urbanization," and a
density restriction designed to preserve open space substantially advanced
this government interest.1 37 Addressing the second prong, the Court found
that since the law neither prevented the best use of the property nor stopped
Agins from pursuing reasonable investment expectations, economically via-
ble use remained.1 38
An example of the Supreme Court's application of this two-pronged test
came seven years after Agins in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 39 the facts of which are remarkably similar to Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.4 ° In Keystone, Pennsylvania law prohibited the re-
moval of fifty percent of the coal beneath certain structures. 4 ' Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association alleged that the law was facially invalid and
constituted a taking since it required leaving twenty-seven million tons of
coal in place and destroyed its support estate-a contractually acquired right
to cause damage to the surface.' 42 The Court found no taking after applying
the two prongs of the Agins test.143
Since the regulation was designed to minimize subsidence in certain areas,
a result that the legislature found harmful, the fifty percent requirement
served an important public interest,'" and therefore could not qualify as a
taking under the first prong of the test.'45 Next, the Court found that the
135. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 263.
137. Id. at 261.
138. The Court reached this conclusion by flatly rejecting Agins's claim that all value was
destroyed and necessarily implying that some use is the equivalent of economically viable use.
Id. at 262.
139. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
140. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
141. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476-77.
142. Id. at 478-79.
143. However, with subtle manipulation of dicta from Agins, the Court lessened the dispos-
itive nature of each prong by saying that when either of the prongs are met, the regulation can
effect a taking, id. at 485, whereas Agins stated that that does effect a taking. Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 265, 260 (1980).
144. The Court distinguished the law in this case from the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania
Coal by noting that the latter's purpose was merely to prevent damage to some private land-
owners' homes. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 487-88.
145. As the dissent noted, the Court applied the Mugler notion that regulation of uses
deemed socially harmful are not takings, hence endorsing the nuisance exception to an extent.
Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see Michelman, supra note 130, at 1601-04 (analyzing
Keystone and its endorsement of the nuisance exception). However, the majority's extensive
discussion that followed, arguing that Keystone had failed to show destruction of economic
viability, undermines the dispositive nature the nuisance exception carried in prior cases. E.g.,
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law passed the second prong because the fifty percent requirement did not
make Keystone's mining commercially impracticable or unprofitable. 146
2. A Per Se, Physical Invasion Rule
Agins and Keystone represent a formalization in takings analysis, injecting
key factors and lessening opportunities to balance competing interests. One
of the key factors is economic impact on private property. 47 Many cases
have found no taking but only after concluding that economically viable use
remained. 148 The only approach in regulatory takings analysis in which
courts need not consider economic impact is one invoked where a regulation
involves a physical invasion of private property. 49 In such cases, there is a
taking per se;15' economic impact is irrelevant.15 Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CA TV Corp. 152 announced this per se, physical invasion rule and
furthered the Supreme Court's trend toward formalizing its approach in tak-
ings analysis.
In Loretto, the Court considered a New York law which required land-
lords to permit installation of a cable on their property to be a taking. ' 5 3 As
the dissent noted, "[a]t issue are about 36 feet of cable one-half inch in diam-
eter and two 4" x 4" x 4" metal boxes" amounting to one eighth of cubic
foot of space on a roof.'54 The majority argued that the Court has long
considered physical intrusions very serious, so serious in fact that the "char-
acter of the governmental action" factor 55 is not a mere factor in these
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The dissent found that destruction of all economically
viable use had occurred and would have required compensation based on this fact alone. Key-
stone, 480 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
146. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495-98. In determining this, the Court defined the relevant unit
of property rather broadly-the entire mining operation, not just extractible coal-such that
only two percent of value was destroyed. The Court further enlarged the unit of property by
regarding the support estate as just one strand in the bundle of rights of Keystone's mineral
estate and not a discrete segment of property in itself. Id. at 501.
147. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296-97
(1981) (holding that the test to be applied, at least in facial challenges, is that a regulation
effects a taking if it denies an owner economically viable use).
148. Eg., Keystone, 480 U.S. 470; Hodel, 452 U.S. 264; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980).
149. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
150. Id. at 426.
151. Economic impact is irrelevant where there is physical invasion because the existence
of physical invasion is "determinative." Id.
152. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
153. Id. at 421.
154. Id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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cases; it is determinative.' 56 The case thus announced what it deemed the
"traditional rule" that permanent physical occupation is a taking per se.' 57
E. Assessment of the Current State of Regulatory Takings Law
One can attempt to generalize the state of takings jurisprudence prior to
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,' but to do so is misleading. Tak-
ings jurisprudence is a very amorphous body of law with various approaches
and consequent inconsistencies.' 59 In conjunction with the issue of whether
any of these tests are satisfactory, it is difficult to predict the outcome of a
takings case because of uncertainty over which test a Court will choose to
employ from the several that are available, as well as the inherent subjectiv-
ity in each."6 The Supreme Court further complicates the issue by invaria-
bly announcing that it makes decisions on an ad hoc basis" 6 -- casting doubt
as to how much precedential value rules advanced in prior cases warrant. 162
Some generalizations about the Court's approach to regulatory takings
decisions may safely be made, however. The nuisance exception doctrine,
firmly rooted in a host of cases dating back to the turn of the century, while
never flatly rejected, 163 has become largely irrelevant in light of recent tak-
ings law. 16 At best, the nuisance exception has degenerated into an
equivalent of the "character of the government action" factor of Penn Cen-
tral,1 6 5 and as such, is clearly not determinative. Indeed, recent trends indi-
156. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
157. Id. at 441; see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (holding that
government air flights over the claimant's property causing severe disturbances on the surface
constituted a taking because they effectively amounted to a direct physical entry).
158. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
159. For a survey of the Supreme Court's conflicting and various approaches to takings
cases, see John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings,
Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1982). The author poignantly summa-
rizes takings jurisprudence as "a widely acknowledged hodgepodge, its doctrines a farrago of
fumblings which have suffered too long from a surfeit of deficient theories." Id. at 244.
160. But see Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987) (claiming that "[t]he framework for
examining [regulatory takings cases] . . . is firmly established and has been regularly and re-
cently reaffirmed").
161. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
162. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 444 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing against categorical rules in takings jurisprudence);
Michelman, supra note 79, at 1166-72 (arguing that the rules-of-decision approach has failed
and is inappropriate for takings law).
163. Accord Lawrence, supra note 126, at 395.
164. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.12, at
430 (4th ed. 1991) ("Although Mugler['s nuisance logic] has never been overruled ... and is,
in fact, still precedent, the Court has judiciously ignored the broad language of Mugler in cases
where [regulatory] governmental action has been found to be a taking."); see also Penn Cen-
tral, 438 U.S. at 133-34 n.30 (expressing doubt as to merits of noxious use test).
165. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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cate that the character of the government action prong itself is less
formidable to claimants attempting to prove a taking, due to the Court's
recently heightened scrutiny of government interests and the means used to
achieve them.
166
Conversely, the role of severity of economic impact has evolved from irrel-
evant under the nuisance exception, 167 to arguably dispositive.' 68  Recent
cases from the United States Court of Federal Claims have found takings by
substantially basing their decisions on destruction of economic value. 169
The current state of regulatory takings law is in need of enhanced predict-
ability and less subjectivity. A clarification as to which approach controls or
an elaboration of how to apply certain tests is required.' 7 ° Specifically, the
time has come to decide the question of whether to dispose of the nuisance
doctrine and uphold a categorical rule that destruction of all economically
viable use is a taking, or to breathe new life into the dying nuisance excep-
tion doctrine and reinforce its role as a major qualification to the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution."', Using
a questionable interpretation of prior law and a remarkable amount of judi-
cial creativity, Justice Scalia resolved this issue in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.'72
166. See Nollan v. California Coastal Council, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (invalidating regu-
lation for failing to have sufficient "nexus" with government interest, thereby heightening judi-
cial scrutiny). For an excellent overview of the varying standards of review the Court has used
in its takings jurisprudence, and Nollan's impact on same, see Zuckerman, supra note 62, at
761-77.
167. See supra part I.A.
168. In legal commentary, at least, this approach has received treatment as a distinct rule
in regulatory takings law. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 8, at 1330-33.
169. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) (holding that the gov-
ernment's denial of a fill permit constituted a taking because of the severe impact on property's
value); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (same); Formanek v.
United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785 (1989) (same).
170. Accord Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1988). Rose-Ackerman, by way of countering a fellow commentator's
theory, argues that increased formalization and predictability are mandatory in the field of
takings law, because the ad hoc approach and shifting doctrines inject uncertainty into inves-
tors' decisions and expectations. Id.; see also David A. Arrensen, Compensation for Regula-
tory Takings: Finality of Local Decisionmaking and the Measure of Compensation, 63 IND. L.J.
649 (1988) (describing how uncertainty regarding potential liability interferes with otherwise
desirable land-use planning).
171. The outcome of such a decision is indeed critical. See, e.g., William A. Falik & Anna
C. Shimko, The "Takings" Nexus-The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use
Planning. A View from California, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 359, 363 (1988) (suggesting that -[i]f
Supreme Court policy is construed as mandating that deprivation of all economic use, standing
alone, constitutes a compensable taking (even if the subject regulation ... is ... a reasonable
exercise of the police power), the practical ramifications will be enormous").
172. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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II. LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,173 the petitioner, Lucas, had
purchased two lots on a barrier island off the coast of South Carolina in 1986
for the purpose of erecting single-family homes. 74 In 1988, South Carolina
enacted the Beachfront Management Act, 17 which prohibited Lucas from
building any permanent, habitable structures on his property. 76 After un-
successfully arguing in the South Carolina Supreme Court that the Act ef-
fected a taking without compensation, Lucas appealed his case to the United
States Supreme Court.177 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case, instructing the lower court to apply a novel concept in takings
jurisprudence.' 8
A. The "Categorical" Rule
The Supreme Court began by asserting that two concepts in takings juris-
prudence have evolved over the years into categorical rules." 9 The first
such rule is the physical invasion test.'18 The Court then noted a second
"categorical" rule: where a regulation denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land, a taking occurs.'
1. Justifications
The Supreme Court described the rationale behind this second categorical
rule. From the landowner's point of view, a regulation that denies all eco-
nomically beneficial use is the equivalent of a regulation that permits com-
plete government appropriation of his property. 182 Further, regulations that
so severely restrict the use of property are, in effect, sometimes dangerously
indistinguishable from an actual exercise of eminent domain.' 83 Such a reg-
ulation can produce substantially equivalent public purposes. 184 Rather
than accomplishing this result through an affirmative act of condemnation,
173. Id.
174. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
175. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Supp. 1990).
176. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
177. Id. at 2890.
178. Id. at 2901-02.
179. Id. at 2893.
180. Id.; see infra part II.D.2.
181. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
182. Id. at 2894; see also United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 181-84
(1958) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing same and suggesting that to hold otherwise would
"permit technicalities of form to dictate consequences of substance").
183. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95.
184. Id.
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however, governmental use of restrictive regulation indirectly can effect the
same public purpose.' 85
2. Application in Lucas
The Supreme Court decided Lucas under the presumption that the South
Carolina Act destroyed all economically beneficial use of Lucas's prop-
erty. 186 This presumption enabled the Court to avoid grappling with the
difficult questions left unanswered in prior cases, such as the extent of deval-
uation necessary to qualify as "complete" destruction,' 87 and identification
of the relevant unit of property against which to measure the loss in-
curred.188 As such, Lucas clearly upheld and easily applied the categorical
"denial of all economically beneficial use" rule but offered no guidance for
determining when all such use has been destroyed.' 8 9
B. Adding a Significant Qualification to the Nuisance Exception
The South Carolina Supreme Court contended that even though the regu-
lation denied all economically beneficial use of Lucas's property, the nui-
sance exception doctrine advanced in Mugler 190 precluded finding a
compensable taking.' 9 ' Because the regulation prevented a harmful use-
contributing to the erosion of the barrier shore-the South Carolina court
reasoned that it was a valid exercise of the police power to prevent a noxious
use, and therefore could not require compensation. 92 This assertion
185. Id. Prominent examples include use restrictions enacted to preserve open space, see
Annicelli v. South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133, 140-41 (R.I. 1983), or to create a wildlife refuge,
see Morris County Land Improvement Col. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 193 A.2d 232,
240 (N.J. 1963).
The Lucas Court further argued that the existence of laws empowering government to use
eminent domain when it wishes to preserve the scenic or ecological integrity of certain lands
implies that to otherwise set such regulations would amount to a taking. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2895. E.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 3921-3923 (1988) (authorizing government acquisition of wetlands).
186. The Court availed itself with this presumption simply because the finding was the
premise of Lucas's Petition for Certiorari and the South Carolina Coastal Council had failed to
challenge it in its Brief in Opposition. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896 n.9.
187. Id. at 2895 n.8.
188. Id. at 2894 n.7 (acknowledging this uncertainty, but apparently asserting relevant unit
in instant case is fee simple interest). For discussion and commentary on the Supreme Court's
varying definitions of property in takings cases, see Peterson, supra note 8, at 1308-16; see also
Michelman, supra note 79, at 1190-93 (criticizing diminution in value theory and uncertainty
in defining property).
189. The Court acknowledged: "Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear
the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2894 n.7.
190. See supra part I.A.
191. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
192. Id. at 2896-97.
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squarely brought the issue of the nuisance exception's vitality before the
United States Supreme Court.
1. The Problem with the Nuisance Exception
The Supreme Court first noted that the noxious use principle advanced in
Mugler was used as part of the Court's initial attempts at articulating the
contemporary rule on the breadth of the police power: that use restrictions
are valid so long as they " 'substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests.' , 193 Justice Scalia, however, shifted the judicial inquiry away from the
review of legislative determinations of" 'noxious' " use, explaining that "the
distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is
often in the eye of the beholder," '19 4 and is therefore riddled with subjectiv-
ity. For example, the South Carolina legislature could label the regulation
"prevention of a noxious use"-beach erosion-and there would be no tak-
ing under the nuisance exception. Conversely, the legislature could define
the regulation as producing a benefit-ecological preservation-and there
would be a taking. 9 5 Consequently, the Court reasoned, the question
whether or not a taking occurs would turn on "whether the legislature has a
stupid staff."1 9 6 The Takings Clause surely requires a more meaningful
test. 197
2. The Solution
In Lucas, the Supreme Court rejected subjective judicial determinations of
harms and benefits and embarked on a search for an "objective, value-free
basis" with which to decide takings claims.1 98 The Court cast aside the
traditional understanding of the nuisance exception and proposed the follow-
ing: When a regulation deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use,
the government is excepted from the compensation requirement if the af-
fected property interest did not inhere in the owner's title from the start.'9 9
The Court recast the focus on nuisance principles as an objective judicial
inquiry into the relevant state laws of property and nuisance that serve to
define the limits and contours of property rights."° This objective inquiry
193. Id. at 2897 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987));
see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
194. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2898 n.12; accord Michelman, supra note 79, at 1196-1201 (arguing that com-
pensability cannot hinge on characterizations of harms and benefits).
197. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898 n.12.
198. Id. at 2899.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2900, 2902 n.18. Acknowledging that there is "some leeway in a court's inter-
pretation of what existing state law permits," Justice Scalia reasoned, however, that a legisla-
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into state property law may reveal that the land use in question is consistent
with preexisting investment-backed expectations that derive from the bundle
of economic rights incident to the ownership of land.2"' Alternatively, the
inquiry may reveal that the landowner took title subject to a preexisting im-
plied limitation on use grounded in state law, which precludes any legitimate
expectation of a right to engage in that use.2 °2 Accordingly, where a land use
denies all economically beneficial use, the regulation can escape the compen-
sation requirement only if its effect does no more than duplicate the result
that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners.20 3
As Justice Scalia observed, it is unlikely that constructing a home on one's
property is a nuisance under South Carolina's laws of property and nui-
sance. 21 Importantly, the government may not rely merely on the general
common law maxim that one cannot use his property to injure another to
prove that a certain activity is a nuisance. 205
III. A CASE OF DESIRABLE JUDICIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP
A. The Categorical Rule
1. "Mere Application" of a Categorical Rule
In Lucas, Justice Scalia declared that in takings law there is a categorical
rule "which we do not invent but merely apply today,, 20 6 that where a regu-
lation denies all economically beneficial use it violates the Fifth Amend-
ment. 207 As the dissent noted, the Court eluded the fact that diminution in
value has not been treated as a categorical rule by the Court.2 °8
In support of this categorical rule, Justice Scalia cites to Agins v. City of
Tiburon ,209 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission ,2 1 Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,2 1' and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n .212 These cases did examine economic impact and recited
ture's creating a rationale to support a confiscatory regulation is subject to far more
manipulation. Id. at 2902 n.18.
201. Id. at 2899.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2900.
204. Id. at 2901. The practical import of the case to Lucas is that it is extremely likely that
South Carolina owes him just compensation, or, if the State elects to rescind its regulation,
Lucas will be entitled to execute his plans to construct residences on his lots. Id. at 2901 n.17.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2893 n.6.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2911 nil (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209. 447 U.S. 255 (1980); see supra part I.D.1.
210. 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see supra note 166.
211. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
212. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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the Agins two-prong test.213 However, not one of the cases found a taking
based on economic impact, 214 nor do any suggest that government interests
become irrelevant once a regulation completely destroys economic value.
The holdings of Agins, Hodel, and Keystone collectively stand for the princi-
ple that if a regulation does not deny all economically beneficial use then it
does not work a taking.215 The inverse of this rule-that if a regulation
denies all beneficial use then it works a taking-is in fact quite another prop-
osition; it is not a necessarily true deduction, but rather an assumption. The
Court's "categorical" rule, therefore, does not spring forth as neatly as Jus-
tice Scalia would have it. Further, dicta in the very cases cited by Justice
Scalia suggest that the Court was disavowing the creation of any categorical
rule;21 6 other cases also have language contradictory to the existence of this
categorical rule. 217 Accordingly, Lucas's categorical rule rests on tenuous
precedential foundation.
Additionally, a per se rule in takings law is contrary to beliefs expressed
frequently throughout it that the field is ill-suited for categorical rules and
general formulae. 2 " Almost all regulatory takings cases 219 include caution-
ary language suggesting that decisions should be made on an ad hoc basis,
balancing certain "factors" such as economic impact and government
interest.220
The dissent correctly noted that the Court's fashioning of a per se rule in
cases of total destruction of value ignores the usual balancing of considera-
tions.22  Takings cases, however, are not so easily generalized. In prior
cases, the Court has announced a "rule" and in the very same case de-
213. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295-96; Agins,
447 U.S. at 260.
214. The Nollan Court found a taking under the first prong of Agins, holding that the
means used by the government in that case were irrational. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-42.
215. E.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295-97.
216. E.g., Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61 (stating that "no precise rule determines when prop-
erty has been taken").
217. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (noting that
diminution in value alone cannot prove a taking); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962) ("Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant, it is by no means con-
clusive.") (citations omitted).
218. E.g., Agins, 447 U.S. at 261; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
219. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), represented a
sharp break from the balancing approach in the case of physical invasions. See supra part
I.D.2. Aside from this exception, the Court has always considered government interest rele-
vant and has not excluded it by creating a per se rule.
220. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (balancing economic impact, interference with invest-
ment-backed expectations, and character of government action); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (balancing economic impact with government interest).
221. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2918-19 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); id. at 2910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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nounced per se rules.2 22 The result is conflicting dicta. Further, with regard
to the often-repeated, but never-fatal second prong of Agins, Lucas presented
a clean slate upon which to write. Arguably, then, the Court "merely ap-
plied" this prong. In light of this more inclusive reading of dicta from prior
case law, it is clear that meaningful criticism of the Lucas decision lies not,
as the dissent argued,22 3 in its categorical nature.22 4 Rather, criticism would
more appropriately be based on an analysis of the rule's merit and suitability
for application in future circumstances. 225
2. The Presumption that the Rule Applies in Lucas
A pivotal assumption in Lucas was that the South Carolina Act rendered
Lucas's two lots valueless.226 Because the South Carolina Coastal Council
did not challenge this premise in its brief, the Supreme Court accepted the
premise and declined to review its merits.227 This presumption troubled
four justices.228 The dissent stated that the finding was simply without
merit, arguing that Lucas was still free to "picnic, swim [or] camp ' 229 and
that Lucas's land is "far from 'valueless.' ,230 The concurrence also believed
the premise of total destruction was questionable.23'
Though these opinions as to the factual validity of the finding may have
merit,232 the justices' concerns are unnecessary. The Court did not decide,
but rather presumed, that the Act destroyed all economically beneficial
222. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (observing that the Court must engage in ad hoe inquiries,
then announcing that any physical invasion is determinative of the takings issue); see also
supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 221.
224. Indeed, some commentators might find Lucas's categorical nature its most commend-
able feature. E.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 170, at 1700-02 (discussing the "perils of case-
by-case analysis").
225. However, evaluating the merit of the Court's per se rule after Lucas proves problem-
atic. See infra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
226. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896 n.9.
227. Id. As such, the case offers no guidance in resolving how to determine whether a
regulation destroys all economically beneficial use of property.
228. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at
2919 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2925 (statement of Souter, J.).
229. Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
230. Id, at 2919 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
232. While the issue is moot for purposes of analyzing Lucas, see infra text accompanying
notes 232-35, the factual inquiry as to whether all economically viable use in Lucas's setting is
destroyed is indeed an intriguing and controversial matter, which may explain the Court's
readiness to accept the finding below and thus preclude further analysis. Indulging in the issue
briefly, observe that Justice Blackmun would tolerate rather significant private loss without
requiring compensation, suggesting that such uses as picnicking and camping that remain for
Lucas-arguably meager consolation after having paid $975,000 for his property-preclude
finding a taking. Lucas, 112 S. Ct at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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use.23 3 It simply did not partake in a factual inquiry as to whether Lucas's
circumstances involved total destruction. As such, though the case offers a
per se rule, it provides no precedential "arsenal" for claimants to use in fu-
ture cases to trigger the rule, other than an opponent's blunder in failing to
challenge a claimant's assertion. 234 Therefore, the dissents' complaints that
Lucas has not suffered total destruction of his property's value are irrele-
vant;235 the Court simply did not "find" that.
Justice Souter, in a Statement, did address a deficiency in Lucas related to
this presumption.236 He was troubled not because the factual finding was
questionable, as he happened to believe,237 but because of the problematic
implications of relying on a questionable premise in a case that advances
such an important per se rule.238 Presuming total destruction meant that
the Court could not provide, among other things, a much-needed clarifica-
tion of the concept of "total" destruction. 239 Because that concept remains
uncertain after Lucas, so does the significance of the per se rule resting uponit.240
In sum, the case offers a powerful rule without instructions. If uncer-
tainty as to future application constitutes a flaw in a per se rule, then in this
shortcoming lies the sharpest criticism to level against Lucas and its categor-
ical rule.241
233. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896 n.9.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2925 (statement of Souter, J.) (commenting that "there is little utility in at-
tempting to deal with this case on the merits").
236. Id. at 2925-26.
237. Id. at 2925 (citing cases that arguably contradict the trial courts' finding that all eco-
nomically beneficial use of Lucas's property was destroyed); see, e.g., Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-502 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Corp. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
238. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2925-27 (statement of Souter, J.).
239. Id. at 2925.
240. Id.
241. Many of the problems in the application of this per se rule needed to be addressed, but
were not, including its apparent arbitrariness (i.e., 95% destruction is not a taking, while only
5% more destruction is a taking), see id. at 2895 n.8; id. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting); what
constitutes total destruction sufficient to trigger the per se rule; and what the relevant unit of
property should be against which to measure the loss. See also id. at 2919-20 (discussing the
manipulability of this aspect of the Court's rule).
Justice Souter, in order to avoid this significant defect, would have dismissed the writ of
certiorari in order to await an opportunity to squarely address the total deprivation question,
so that more certain legal principles could accompany the per se rule. Id. at 2925 (statement
of Souter, J.).
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B. The Exception
In addition to recognizing a categorical rule in regulatory takings analysis,
Lucas also discussed a type of exception to the compensation requirement of
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.242 The Supreme Court rejected the
approach under which the existence of some " 'noxious'" or " 'harmful' "
use precluded finding a taking, regardless of any other factors.243 The Court
did, however, uphold a type of nuisance exception to the Takings Clause,
defining the parameters of this exception in such a way that its applicability
is quite limited. 2"
1. Wisely Rejecting "Noxious Use" as a Determining Factor
The Lucas Court was correct in abolishing the old approach that hinged
on the presence of a so-called "noxious-use."245 Under this theory, the
Court would not find a violation of the Fifth Amendment, regardless of a
regulation's economic impact on the property owner, so long as the state
legislature enacted the regulation to prevent a serious public harm.24 6 There
is an obvious danger in this theory, as Justice Scalia rightly noted,247 because
to avoid finding a taking, a court need only look to the legislature's intent in
enacting the use restriction.24 In light of the usual deference the Court
affords legislatures,"' any reasonably related attempt to abate what could
arguably cause a public harm would not be a taking.25° The decision turned
on the legislature's characterization of the regulation as preventing a public
harm, which ultimately amounts to a meaningless test,25 ' for almost any use
restriction conceivably prevents a harm. 252 The South Carolina Act in the
instant case illustrates how elusive the distinction between harm-preventing
and benefit-conferring can be.253
If all that is needed to trigger an exception to the compensation require-
ment is a legislative recital of some harm prevention, then the exception
242. Id. at 2899-900.
243. Id. at 2897.
244. Id. at 2900.
245. Id. at 2899.
246. See supra part I.A.
247. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
248. Id. at 2898.
249. But see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (heightening the
level of scrutiny that a court must use in takings cases when analyzing the rationality of a state
regulation).
250. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899 (stating that "departure would virtually always be
allowed").
251. Id. at 2898 n.12.
252. See Michelman, supra note 79, at 1196-201 (criticizing noxious use doctrine because
"the test invites improper application").
253. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
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swallows the rule; this surely is unjustified. It relies heavily on the discretion
of judges in discerning the harm/benefit distinction and precludes basing
regulatory takings analysis "on an objective, value-free basis." '2 54 Courts
should continue to indulge in the usual deference to states when reviewing
the legitimacy of legislative exercises of the police power. However, courts
should not permit a legislative characterization of "harm" to control the
determination of whether that exercise requires compensation as a matter of
constitutional law.255 To do so invites use of the police power as a short-cut
to the categorical mandate of the Fifth Amendment, that when private prop-
erty is taken for public use, compensation is required.2 56
In addition to the consequences noted above, there are reasons not men-
tioned in Lucas that support the Court's rejection of the noxious use test.
First, a plain reading of the Fifth Amendment shows that the Takings
Clause is a categorical rule.25 7 The compensation requirement has no quali-
fying language such as "unless the government interest is great."2 5 Its cate-
gorical nature casts doubt on the validity of any per se exceptions to it.
Second, because the noxious use exception makes impact on the owner
irrelevant and government interest determinative, it seems fundamentally
flawed. A plain reading of the Takings Clause shows that it is a limit on
government power, and a protection of private property owners. 259 In ig-
noring the negative impact a law has on a private property owner, the nox-
ious/harmful use exception is incongruous with this basic principle of the
Takings Clause. 2"
254. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
255. For a contrary view, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Tak-
ings Jurisprudence, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 1892, 1943 (1992) (arguing that courts should accept a
legislature's position as to whether compensation is due because the legislature is more capable
of balancing competing interests).
256. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (warning that "a
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change").
257. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads: "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V.
258. Paraphrasing, e.g., Amicus Brief for the American Mining Congress, et al. at 4, Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453).
259. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 164, § 11.11, at 424 (noting that "[t]he
just compensation clause of the fifth amendment ... was built upon this concept of a moral
obligation to pay for governmental interference with private property"); Peterson, supra note
52, at 339 (noting that "[s]ince ... Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it has been clear that the
just compensation clause was designed to promote balanced fairness and justice to property
owners and the public").
260. Accord Lawrence, supra note 126, at 395 (remarking that "[g]iven the drastic reduc-
tions in value that a use restriction can bring about, the constitutionally mandated right to
compensation... could not plausibly hinge entirely on whether the government characterized
a use as harmful").
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2. Soundly Recasting the Nuisance "Exception" in its Proper Role
Lucas aptly restructured the traditional nuisance exception doctrine so
that the obvious failings previously attached to it are greatly diminished.
The rule now is that a government may avoid compensating total destruc-
tion of value only if the use restricted did not inhere in the owner's title from
the start according to the state's law of property and nuisance. 261 This prin-
ciple is quite sound-so much so that the Court's new version of the old
doctrine is more accurately described as a long-awaited statement of the ob-
vious. 262 When a state stops a nuisance, it is not "taking" any property at
all, for a nuisance can never be a property right. 2
63
The Supreme Court thus discarded its historical reliance on nuisance prin-
ciples as providing an unwritten exception to the Fifth Amendment compen-
sation requirement, and now looks to nuisance law to define the scope of
property under the Takings Clause.2 6 Such principles are now part of the
textual rule rather than the basis for an exception.265
What the Court in Lucas found unjust was the practice of declaring that a
use previously inhering in the owner's title had become nuisance-like or
harm-causing, and the state's invoking of the nuisance exception or a similar
principle to escape compensation.266 In such cases, the government is taking
away a property right that the owner previously enjoyed. Regardless of the
new "nuisance" characterization of the activity, the right to engage in such
activity has been taken and the government must pay.
The Court in Lucas provided a rule consistent with this notion. 267 The
rule in Lucas ensures that when the government takes a property right previ-
ously enjoyed and thereby causes severe impairment of economically benefi-
cial use, it must compensate. 268  After-the-fact characterizations by a
legislature are no longer sufficient to trigger an "exception" in such cases.
As the Court noted,269 defining property rights with reference to previous
entitlements and expectations is not an entirely new concept in constitu-
261. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992).
262. Id. at 2901 (stating that "this recognition ... is surely unexceptional").
263. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987)
(stating that individuals have no property right to create a nuisance, and therefore a state has
"taken" nothing when it enjoins a nuisance).
264. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 2898 n.12 (stating that "the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than
insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations").
267. Id. at 2900.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 2901.
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tional law,27 ° nor in takings jurisprudence in particular.27 ' However, defin-
ing nuisances in terms of state common law, rather than in terms of the
Supreme Court's opinions, is novel.272 In Lucas, the Court apparently was
aware of this, making no assertion that it was merely "applying" a rule as it
had with the economically-beneficial-use rule.273 On balance, the benefits of
this rule outweigh the "cost" of this display of judicial creativity. By an-
nouncing that property is essentially what state law holds it is, the Court
made strides toward divorcing legislatures' dubious "harmful use" charac-
terizations as well as judges' own values from the takings analysis.274
In this way, the Court has tempered takings jurisprudence with a stroke of
federalism. Although the Constitution singles property out for protec-
tion,2 75 defining property is peculiarly within the province of state law.2 76 In
order to define a given property interest, both state and federal courts have
traditionally deferred to the law of the state where the property is located.2 77
Nuisance law, which is one aspect of state law that defines property, already
involves a balancing of private and public interests against a background of
270. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that continued govern-
ment employment is not "property" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment under "existing
rules or understanding that stem from an independent source such as state law").
271. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (holding
that state took "property" protected by the Fifth Amendment when it kept interest accruing
on an interpleader fund deposited in court registry, defining property as state-created rights
under the Roth rationale).
272. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2913 n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). There is scant support,
if any, from prior regulatory takings cases for the Court's definition of the nuisance exception.
Many cases excused compensation despite severe economic impact where common law did not
already prohibit the restricted use. See cases cited supra note 40.
273. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 n.6.
274. Note, however, that if Justice Scalia was on a quest to formulate a bright-line rule in
an attempt to eliminate all vagueness and subjectivity in regulatory takings jurisprudence, as
he has in other areas of constitutional law, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (insisting upon precise governing standards as opposed to balancing
tests), he has not entirely succeeded. The states' common law of nuisance is not a tidy list of
what is a nuisance and what is not. One will not find strict, objective principles in the states'
common law and as such, the Lucas dissent argued, its interpretation is as manipulatable as
the harm/benefit distinction that Justice Scalia found problematic. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
275. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting "houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures"); U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process and takings); U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIV (due process).
276. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (stating that "[w]hile the
meaning of 'property' as used in the Fifth Amendment [is] a federal question, 'it will normally
obtain its content by reference to local law.'" (quoting United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S.
266, 279 (1943))).
277. This deference has been a basic premise of both constitutional law, see Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, (1972), and has been one of the few unchanging rules in conflict
of laws theory. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 208-13; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222.
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public policy and local values.2 7 s However, prior to the Lucas decision, pre-
cedent dicated that judges must strike a nuisance-type balance of their own
to determine the takings issue.279
In Lucas, Justice Scalia imported state nuisance law into the regulatory
takings analysis wholesale, suggesting that judges, rather than subjectively
striking the balance anew as a matter of constitutional law, should objec-
tively look to the balances already struck by state courts and legislatures.28
State courts arguably balance interests with an equal amount of subjectiv-
ity.2"' Nonetheless, the Lucas Court's rule suggests that, with regard to
property, this subjectivity is legitimate and appropriate only in state forums.
By recognizing that the states are responsible for defining property, Justice
Scalia crafts a careful equilibrium between state and federal law and begins
to answer criticism of the Supreme Court's balancing approach.2 2
The dissenting and concurring justices criticized the majority's redefini-
tion of the nuisance exception as completely inappropriate.2 3 Justices Ken-
nedy and Stevens both argued that limiting nuisance exceptions to state
common law of property and nuisance will make it difficult for states to react
to changing conditions, enslaving them to the common law.284 Specifically,
Justice Kennedy stated that the common law is "too narrow a confine for the
exercise of regulatory power."' 285 Now, the dissent argued, every movement
away from the common law will require compensation.286
These sweeping charges are false. Not all legislative movements away
from states' common law of property and nuisance will require compensa-
tion under the Supreme Court's nuisance exception rule-only those that
destroy all economically beneficial use. 287 A state government is still able to
prohibit harmful uses of property and to respond to changing conditions as
needed. Property remains subject to an implied limitation and must still
278. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705-07 (Ariz. 1972);
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871-72 (N.Y. 1970); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 812B cmt. e; id. at §§ 822-31.
279. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978); Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1986).
280. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, at 2900-02 (1992).
281. See supra note 274.
282. "When the judge weighs the elements to be balanced, the weights will be assigned in
accordance with the judge's view of what is important. Whether one interest or set of interests
'outweighs' another... depends on which of them the judge values more highly." Patrick M.
McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 643 (1988), quoted in Zuckerman, supra
note 62, at 768 n.106.
283. See infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
284. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2921 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
285. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
286. Id. at 2922 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 2899.
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yield to the police power from time to time.288 It is entirely conceivable that
not all attempts to prevent harmful use will cause total destruction of eco-
nomically beneficial use and will therefore not necessitate compensation even
if they do go beyond the common law. The dissent failed to recognize this.
For those limitations on property use that are so severe as to destroy all
economically beneficial use, and take away a property right not previously
forbidden in common law, the state must pay.289 Although the public need
for certain use restrictions on property may be great, and although compen-
sation may be cumbersome, there can be no shortcut to effecting these
changes by avoiding the compensation requirement of the Fifth
Amendment.29 °
The dissent also questioned the majority's insistence on using common
law, the product of judges long dead, in defining property. 29' There is
"nothing magical" about their opinions, and in fact they engaged in the very
sort of subjective balancing that the Court found so offensive when per-
formed by a legislature or even itself, the dissent argued.2 92
This view forgets the purpose underlying the majority's rule. The major-
ity did not resort to common law because it found superiority of old state
judges' reasoning over that of the legislatures. That is irrelevant. The ma-
jority insisted on using the common law of property and nuisance because
they determine what inhered in an owner's title when he acquired it.2 93 The
whole point of the rule involves turning to preexisting state law to determine
what is a nuisance, and therefore not a property right, and to rid the Court
of the business of defining these things.2 94 In doing so, the rule ends retroac-
tive removal of property rights from bundles acquired earlier, and ensures
that the Fifth Amendment will not be forgotten.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lucas served an important role in sensibly recasting doctrines that were in
risk of straying from the Fifth Amendment's categorical mandate, and pre-
vented that mandate from becoming further muddled into the depths of the
amorphous and complicated body of regulatory takings law. The case made
clear that denial of all economically viable use is a taking and ensured that
legislative recital of harm prevention will no longer be a convenient way of
288. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
289. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
290. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
291. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 2899.
294. See id. at 2898-99 (explaining how the prior approach made it "difficult, if not impos-
sible, to discern [the takings issue] on an objective, value-free basis").
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sidestepping the need to compensate such severe denials. As such, Lucas
represents a victory for property rights advocates by drawing a formidable
"line in the sand" that crafters of draconian land-use regulations must not
overstep.
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